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"These [Fourth Amendment rights], I protest, are not mere second-
class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among
deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population,
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective
weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government." Justice Robert
H. Jackson.*
INTRODUCTION
"We confront a 'disgusting and saddening' episode at our Nation's
t Cameron W. Eubanks, J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Miami School of Law. B.A.
2007, University of Central Florida. This note is dedicated to my parents, Lynn and Wayne, and
my sister, Crystal. Your constant love and support has made me the man I am today. I would also
like to give a special thanks to Eric Rudenberg for his insight and editing on earlier drafts of this
note.
* Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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border."' At airports all across the country, the government is using an
unlimited power to search individuals arriving on international flights
without any suspicion. This is not a new power, but it is now being used
in a new way. Instead of the overtly intrusive and degrading methods of
old,' the new searches afford the government the ability to delve into the
caverns of an individual's mind. By that, government agents can now
search all the contents and files of an individual's computer without any
prior suspicion. From the simplest document, to the most private pic-
tures and conversations, the government has been given the ability to
peer into these matters with absolutely no justification. United States v.
Arnold,3 has endorsed this proposition, to the fear of civil libertarians
and those who value their privacy, and their dignity, upon crossing
borders.
In Part I, this note will analyze the doctrinal changes in Fourth
Amendment4 jurisprudence that led up to the Court's holding in Arnold.
It analyzes the move toward the balancing test of reasonableness in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as well as the border search exception
to the Fourth Amendment. Part II of the note provides a history of the
most prescient cases that preceded Arnold. The underlying factual and
procedural history of Arnold is detailed in Part III of the note. The opin-
ion of Arnold will be dissected in Part IV.
Part V argues that the border search exception to the Fourth
Amendment should be eliminated and that all searches should be con-
ducted on a showing of at least reasonable suspicion, if not more toward
the probable cause standard. In addition, Part V argues that the search of
an individual's laptop is highly intrusive and offensive. Therefore, it
requires a heightened amount of suspicion before a search of this magni-
tude can take place. Part V continues by stressing that the search in
Arnold is also unreasonable because it was not limited in scope and was
outside the spirit of what the border search exception is meant to accom-
plish. Part V finally describes what this case means for the future of the
Fourth Amendment and privacy interests at the border. A case has
1. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 545 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89, 94 (9th Cir. 1973) (Ely, J., dissenting)).
2. See, e.g., Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 534-35 (describing an alimentary canal
search of a suspected cocaine smuggler).
3. 533 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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already cited Arnold with approval,5 showing that this new innovation in
the Fourth Amendment is likely going to be a permanent fixture in the
landscape of border searches.
I. THE SHRINKING FOURTH AMENDMENT
Arnold lies at the intersection of a citizen's desire to avoid
unwanted state incursion into one's private life6 and a state's need to
control its own borders for the sake of maintaining its sovereignty and
integrity.7 This balance between the state and the individual is routinely
tipped very much in favor of the state when searches occur at the
border.8
A. Firm Rules to a Flexible Test
Since the Warren Court, the Fourth Amendment has been read in
light of one of the most important cases of its time, Katz v. United
States.9 In Katz, the government placed "an electronic listening and
recording device" on a phone booth to intercept the telephone conversa-
tion of the individual inside. 10 The Court held this eavesdropping to be a
search.ll It announced that a search took place wherever the person had
a subjective expectation of privacy and society was willing to recognize
that privacy interest as reasonable.' 2 The Fourth Amendment was read to
protect people, not just places anymore.' 3 With its newfound interest in
5. See United States v. Singh, No. 07-30421, 2008 WL 4426643, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 29,
2008).
6. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.").
7. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) ("Courts have long
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by
the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control.") (citing Chae Chan
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889)).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-58 (1976); United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539-40, 544 (1985).
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10. Id. at 348.
11. Id. at 353.
12. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The reciprocal of this idea is where an individual has
no expectation of privacy, no search takes place. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment is not
disturbed. See id. at 351 (majority opinion).
13. Id. The holding in Katz reverses the one reached in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928). In Olmstead, a wiretap was not found to be a search under the Fourth Amendment
because the Amendment was interpreted to protect only tangible materials or against an invasion
into the home or the curtilage of the home. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464. Katz makes clear that
there are not protected areas under the Fourth Amendment, but instead individuals can have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in many areas deserving of Fourth Amendment protection. Katz,
389 U.S. at 351-52. The position taken in Katz is the same as the one Justice Brandeis took in
dissent in Olmstead. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474-75. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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protecting people's privacy, the Court set up a structure that the govern-
ment must use prior to every search of an individual.' 4 The Court
believed this unbreakable command came from the Fourth Amendment
itself. First, for a search to be constitutional, the government must pos-
sess probable cause. 5 Once probable cause is found, the government
must obtain a warrant, or exigent circumstances must exist to make get-
ting a warrant unrealistic.' 6 The Court's preference for warrants was so
strong that searches without a warrant were almost always per se unrea-
sonable. 17 The newly minted Fourth Amendment would not last long
though. Announced in Terry v. Ohio,'8 and continuing through the Bur-
ger and Rehnquist Courts, 9 the reasonableness of the search became the
controlling factor in the analysis of its constitutionality.2 ° The probable
cause and warrant framework was hastily being phased out as too rigid
14. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 ("The government agents here ignored the procedure of antecedent
justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment, a procedure that we hold to be a
constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case.") (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 358.
16. [T]he "warrant requirement" had become so riddled with exceptions that it was
basically unrecognizable. In 1985, one commentator cataloged [sic] nearly 20 such
exceptions, including "searches incident to arrest... automobile searches... border
searches . . . administrative searches of regulated businesses . . . exigent
circumstances ... search[es] incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to
arrest ... boat boarding for document checks ... welfare searches . . . inventory
searches . . . airport searches . . . school search[es] .. "
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Craig M.
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985).
17. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 732 (1987) ("While as a general rule warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable, we have recognized exceptions when 'special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable'") (quoting New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring)).
18. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
19. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence became more conservative, beginning in 1969, with
Chief Justice Burger's appointment to the Court, and continued through the Rehnquist years. This
trend has continued to the present day as the make-up of the Court has shifted to the right,
dismantling more of the Warren Court's holdings. The case law of the Supreme Court would bear
out this fact. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (a determination of probable
cause is found through a "totality of the circumstances," not with a structure of specific tests);
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (probable cause in the context of a car allows police to search
containers within the car); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (officer's motive in
arresting does not play part in arrest's constitutionality, as long as probable cause exists);
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003) (individualized probable cause not needed to arrest
any or all passengers in a car where contraband is found). See generally, Madhavi M. McCall &
Michael A. McCall, Chief Justice William Rehnquist: His Law-and-Order Legacy and Impact on
Criminal Justice, 39 AKRON L. REv. 323, 338-39 (2006).
20. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21. Terry's reasonableness standard for stop and frisk builds off
of the synthetic type probable cause and area warrants that were created in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (holding that less than probable cause could be used in municipal
inspections and still pass Fourth Amendment muster).
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and difficult for law enforcement to deal with.21 The more conservative
Courts have read the Fourth Amendment to only prohibit unreasonable
searches, not to create a probable cause and warrant requirement.
2 2
When dealing with reasonableness instead of the Katz framework, many
searches have been found to be reasonable, even where probable cause
or a warrant is lacking. In some situations, like at the border, both may
be absent.23 A balancing test is much more flexible and deferential to
law enforcement than the rigid rule structure of Katz when determining
whether a search is reasonable. 24 The government's interests sit on one
side of the scale, across from the individual's rights and dignity.
Where the government's interest outweighs the individual's, the search
is reasonable and therefore constitutional.26 Searches conducted at the
border have been considered reasonable strictly because they occur at
the border.27 Here, the government is said to have the highest interest,
and the individual has a much lower interest when presenting oneself for
entry into the country.2" Nearly all searches that occur at the border are
found reasonable.29
B. The Sovereign's Inherent Authority at the Border
In addition to the trend toward reasonableness in search and seizure
doctrine,3" Arnold's holding endorses the concept of the implied power
of a sovereign to exclude whomever it chooses at its borders.3 ' In order
for a state to maintain itself, it must have an absolute power to control its
21. A stop and frisk need only be reasonable. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31. A reasonableness
balancing of interests test is applied to administrative and regulatory searches. See Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-10 (1979)
for an example of reasonableness balancing in cases involving "seizures... less intrusive than...
traditional arrest[s]"). School searches by administration must be reasonable. T.LO., 469 U.S. at
341-42. Use of police force must be reasonable. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
22. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
23. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004).
24. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) ("We think it too plain for
argument that the State's proffered justification-the safety of the officer-is both legitimate and
weighty.").
25. Id. at 109 ("Reasonableness [of the search] depends 'on a balance between public interest
and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.' ")
(quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
26. See id. at 111.
27. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152-53.
28. Id. at 152-53, 155.
29. See id. at 152-53 ("Time and again, we have stated that 'searches made at the border,
pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining
persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that
they occur at the border."') (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)).
30. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
31. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S 132, 154 (1925) ("Travellers may be so stopped in
crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one
2010] 1121
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own borders. It has been reasoned that if the state does not have this
power, then other states will have control over the integrity of the state
that cannot control and maintain the flow of people and goods into its
interior.32 If other nations could send anything into another that they
wished, then the open state would be powerless to defend itself and
would ultimately collapse.33 This power to control the borders is a ple-
nary and absolute power of the Federal Government. 34 To execute this
power, searches of persons and material that cross the border can be
conducted by the government with little to no prior justification.35
Because the government has an absolute ability to exclude and control
the borders, it must then follow that items being brought into the country
can be searched as an ancillary to this plenary power-as the Court has
routinely held.36
C. The Border Search Exception
The border search exception was born out of this power of the fed-
eral government to exclude whomever and whatever it wished at the
border.37 Courts have held that because the government has a nearly
unlimited power at the border, the Fourth Amendment's limit on govern-
ment search and seizures should be discarded in favor of a blanket rule
that the government need not have suspicion to justify its search. These
searches at the border need not be preceded by any level of suspicion as
the government's power here is so great, supposedly trumping any
Fourth Amendment concerns of the individual.38 These searches have
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which
may be lawfully brought in.").
32. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
603-04 (1889) ("Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every
independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to
that extent subject to the control of another power.").
33. See id.
34. See id. This power to control the borders is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. It has
been an understood implied power of the federal government since announced in the Chinese
Exclusion Case (federal government has absolute right to exclude aliens at the border). See United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541
U.S. 149, 153 (2004).
35. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538.
36. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (stating that the power
extends to "individuals or conveyances"); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154 (requiring entrants at the
border to identify themselves and their belongings).
37. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272 (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at
603-04; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154).
38. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment's balance of
reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border than in the interior. Routine
searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or warrant"); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-63
(1976) (holding that it is not a Fourth Amendment violation for Border Patrol to stop motorists at
[Vol. 64:11171122
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been considered reasonable strictly for the fact that they occur at the
border.39
The border search exception also includes places that are at the
"functional equivalent" of the border.4" A search may not be possible as
the individual arrives directly at the border, so the reasoning of the bor-
der search exception extends to these areas as well.4 ' Arrival on an inter-
national flight has consistently been considered an area that is the
functional equivalent to the border under the border search exception.42
D. What is Routine?
Under the border search exception there can be routine searches
and nonroutine searches.43 Routine searches require no level of suspi-
cion before the official can perform them and are of a less intrusive
nature.' Nonroutine searches and seizures are those that are of a highly
intrusive nature. Detention to perform a search of the alimentary canal is
one such search seizure that is considered nonroutine. This nonroutine
search requires reasonable suspicion before it can be performed, and any
detention to conduct the search must be reasonable as well.46 In dicta,
the Supreme Court suggested that x-ray, strip, and cavity searches may
also be nonroutine but declined to announce what level of suspicion, if
any, is necessary before the government can conduct them at the border
border checkpoints without individualized suspicion, even if the stop is apparently based on
national origin).
39. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) ("That searches made at the border,
pursuant to the long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining
persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that
they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration.").
40. Whatever the permissible scope of intrusiveness of a routine border search might
be, searches of this kind may in certain circumstances take place not only at the
border itself, but at its functional equivalents as well. For example, searches at an
established station near the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more
roads that extend from the border, might be functional equivalents of border
searches. For another example, a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane
arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City would clearly
be the functional equivalent of a border search.
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-73.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537-38 (describing some searches at the border
as "routine").
44. See id. For instances of routine border searches that do not require any suspicion, see
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (luggage); United States v. Hsi Huei Tsai, 282
F.3d 690, 696 (9th Cir. 2002) (briefcase and luggage); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805,
808 (9th Cir. 1967) ("purse, wallet, or pockets"); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (plurality opinion) (pictures).
45. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.
46. Id.
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or its functional equivalent.47
The Court in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez did not accept
that Fourth Amendment analysis would be based on any new third level
of suspicion beyond reasonable suspicion or probable cause.48 Officials
detained Montoya de Hernandez to conduct an alimentary canal
search.49 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a "clear indication of alimen-
tary canal smuggling" must exist before a traveler could be detained.5"
On review, the Supreme Court rejected this clear indication standard.5
While the terms routine and nonroutine seem to be categorical, requiring
one level of suspicion for routine and another level of suspicion for
nonroutine searches, the Court, in a later case, clarified that the terms are
descriptive at best and provide little actual use.5" The Court looks to
each type of search and its facts before determining what level of suspi-
cion might be necessary before it can be constitutionally performed.53 In
Montoya de Hernandez the search was labeled routine, and this language
seemed to spawn a categorical approach among lower courts.
Since then, the Court has continually downplayed any categorical
distinction between routine and nonroutine border searches.54 It again
took the opportunity in United States v. Flores-Montano to mention that
border searches are analyzed by their intrusiveness, and not whether the
search fits into a routine or nonroutine category.55 Flores-Montano,
decided after September 1 1th, held that a vehicle's gas tank could be
removed and dissembled at the border without any reasonable
56suspicion.
47. Id. at 541 n.4 ("Because the issues are not presented today we suggest no view on what
level of suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches such as strip, body-cavity, or
involuntary x-ray searches.").
48. Id. at 541.
49. Id. at 532-33.
50. Id. at 540.
51. The Court of Appeals held that the initial detention of respondent was permissible
only if the inspectors possessed a "clear indication" of alimentary canal smuggling.
This "clear indication" language comes from our opinion in Schmerber v.
California, but we think that the Court of Appeals misapprehended the significance
of that phrase in the context in which it was used in Schmerber. The Court of
Appeals viewed "clear indication" as an intermediate standard between "reasonable
suspicion" and "probable cause." But we think that the words in Schmerber were
used to indicate the necessity for particularized suspicion that the evidence sought
might be found within the body of the individual, rather than as enunciating still a
third Fourth Amendment threshold between "reasonable suspicion" and "probable
cause."
Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
52. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 152-53.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 155.
1124 [Vol. 64:1117
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In addition to allowing routine nonintrusive searches based on no
suspicion, and highly intrusive nonroutine searches to be based on a rea-
sonable suspicion, border searches must be limited in their scope to be
reasonable." The search must be no more intrusive than necessary, and
the initial search must confirm or dispel the official's suspicions.5 8 If the
suspicions are gone after a cursory search, then the search must end.59
The search is not limited in scope if the item will be destroyed, because
at this point a routine search would become highly intrusive and then a
reasonable suspicion would be needed before the property could be
destroyed.6 ° The search of a laptop at the border raises interesting ques-
tions about whether this type of search really can be limited in scope.
II. THE ROAD TO ARNOLD
"While many courts have stopped their analysis after finding a rea-
sonable suspicion, a few courts have dealt with the issue of laptop bor-
der searches more directly."6 While Arnold was truly a suspicionless
search, two cases have predictive value in understanding Arnold. The
first, United States v. Romm,62 was decided by the same Ninth Circuit
Court just two years prior to Arnold. The case involves a similar search
of a computer at the border.63 Romm had looked at child pornography
on his computer over the Internet and then deleted the images, but the
deleted images remained in his computer's Internet cache.M Romm flew
to Canada where he was stopped for questioning regarding his prior
criminal history.65 The agents at the airport booted up his computer and
looked at his Internet history.66 Several child pornography websites were
found, and he was subsequently denied access to Canada. 67 Romm was
held in "detention until the next flight" back to the United States, via
Seattle, Washington. 68 His computer was searched again once he arrived
57. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985).
58. See id. at 544; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999) ("[I]f the scope of the search
exceeds that permitted by . . . the character of the relevant exception from the warrant
requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more.").
59. See United States v. Price, 472 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1973).
60. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155-56.
61. Rasha Alzahabi, Note, Should You Leave Your Laptop Home When Traveling Abroad?:
The Fourth Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers, 41 IND. L. REv. 161, 170
(2008) (discussing United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005) and United States v.
Romm, 455 F.3d 990 (9th Cir 2006)).
62. 455 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006).
63. Id. at 993.
64. Id.
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back in the United States.69 In Romm's case the Ninth Circuit held that
the computer could be searched without reasonable suspicion under the
border search doctrine as a routine search. 70 The Ninth Circuit stated,
"[t]hus, the routine border search of Romm's laptop was reasonable
... .,,71 Romm is not exactly the same as Arnold because the defendant
in Romm had first been searched by foreign officials in Canada.7" While
slightly different, Romm does show that the Ninth Circuit was willing to
accept that a search of a computer at the border was routine prior to its
decision in Arnold.73 It gave short shrift to any argument based on the
intrusiveness of the search or whether the material searched was of an
expressive nature.74
The second border search case, United States v. Ickes,75 was handed
down from the Fourth Circuit in 2005. Ickes attempted to enter the
United States from Canada, and his van was stopped at the border.76 His
computer was searched after two prior searches of his vehicle turned up
suspicious videos and marijuana.77 Ickes's computer contained child
pornography, similar to Arnold's. 78 In contrast to Arnold, before search-
ing the defendant's computer, the officials in Ickes had prior suspicion
based on contraband found in Ickes's vehicle.7 9 Also, Ickes's computer
was found inside his vehicle, which the court has time and again found
to be a reasonable search.8° The court found Ickes's policy argument to
be fanciful.8" It stated:
Ickes claims that our ruling is sweeping. He warns that "any person
carrying a laptop computer.., on an international flight would be
subject to a search of the files on the computer hard drive." This
prediction seems far-fetched. Customs agents have neither the time
nor the resources to search the contents of every computer.82
69. Id.
70. Id. at 997.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 994. The defendant in Arnold was searched by U.S. officials as he attempted to
enter the U.S. from the Philippines. U.S. v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
73. See Romm, 455 F.3d at 997.
74. See id. (declining to address the intrusiveness argument because it was not raised in the
defendant's brief).
75. 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005).
76. Id. at 502.
77. Id. at 502-03.
78. Id. at 503; U.S. v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1312 (2009).
79. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 503.
80. Id. at 505-06 (discussing the government's "broad authority to search the belongings of
would-be entrants" at the border).
81. See id. at 506-07.
82. Id.
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As Arnold would find out, the court's forecast would miss the mark. The
government has seized on this very power that the Ickes court down-
played. The government now conducts widespread searches of com-
puters based on no prior suspicion-all from the power of the border
search exception.
III. FROM THE PHILIPPINES TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT
On July 27, 2005, Michael Arnold's flight arrived at Los Angeles
International Airport.83 He had just completed a twenty-three hour jour-
ney from the Philippines where he had been on "vacation for three
weeks visiting friends."84 Arnold proceeded to customs after collecting
his bags.85 He was selected for a secondary screening by Customs and
Border Protection ("CPB") officer Laura Peng while he was standing in
line to enter the country.8 6 Mr. Arnold was forced to boot up his com-
puter that was packed away inside his luggage.8 7 The computer was
turned over to another CPB officer, John Roberts, while Officer Peng
continued to search Arnold's other belongings.88 Six compact discs and
a flash drive were found as well.89 While searching the computer, the
officers proceeded to click on the desktop icons titled "Kodak Pictures"
and "Kodak Memories," even though the computer was booted up solely
to determine whether it was operational.9" Once inside the picture files,
the officers viewed a photograph containing two naked women.9"
Officer Roberts alerted his superiors, who in turn contacted Immigration
and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") with the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS").92 Arnold was detained by ICE agents for several
hours and interrogated about the contents of his computer.93 ICE found
more nude pictures after a further search of Arnold's computer, this time
some of them believed to be child pornography. 94 ICE seized the com-
puter, flash drive, and CDs, and allowed Mr. Arnold to leave.95 Two
weeks later, federal agents received a warrant based on their initial sus-
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picionless search.9 6  The search turned up even more child
pornography.97
In the United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia, Arnold brought a motion to suppress the initial photographs
taken at the airport and the photos obtained using the warrant.98
Arnold's motion to suppress was granted by the district court, which
held that a search of a person's computer hard drive and storage devices
is of such an intrusive nature that reasonable suspicion is required for the
search to pass constitutional muster under the Fourth Amendment.99
According to the district court, such suspicion was required even where
the search occurs at the functional equivalent of a border'0° after a pas-
senger arrives on an international flight. 10 1 The court also determined
that the CPB officers lacked the requisite "reasonable suspicion."1'02
Arnold's nervousness was not sufficient to give an officer reasonable
suspicion to search.° 3 The district court also found that the search was
not limited in scope. " The scope of the search should have been limited
to booting up the computer to confirm that it was a working device.00
The court used a sliding scale test to determine the constitutionality of
the laptop computer search.10 6 Under the test, "as the intrusiveness of
[the] search increases," so must the amount of suspicion needed to con-
duct the search. 107 According to the court, while the balance is usually
tipped in the government's favor at the border, the computer's hard drive
contains the type of data and information that makes a search of its con-
tents highly intrusive-intrusive enough where some suspicion would be
needed. '
0 8
On review, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order
granting the motion to suppress. 0 9 The Ninth Circuit ultimately held
that "reasonable suspicion is not needed" for the government to search a
96. Id.
97. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 533 F.3d
1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
98. Id. at 1000.
99. Id. at 1000-01.
100. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973) (noting that the
search of passengers and cargo arriving in the U.S. after an international flight would "clearly be
the functional equivalent of a border search").
101. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1002-03.
102. Id. at 1004.
103. Id. at 1006.
104. Id. at 1007.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1003.
107. Id. (citing United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995)).
108. Id. at 1002-03.
109. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1312 (2009).
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computer hard drive and storage devices at the United States border or
its functional equivalent. ° Arnold's motion to suppress was reversed
and the child pornography found on his computer was admitted.tl'
IV. THE OPINION tN UNITED STATES V. ARNOLD
A. The Government's Plenary Power at the Border
The Ninth Circuit begins its analysis in Arnold by reminding us all
that the government has great power to search and exclude at the bor-
der.'t Drawing on the dicta of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,11 3 the
Ninth Circuit labels the search of Arnold's computer at the airport as at
the "functional equivalent of the border," so as to bring this search under
the border search exception to traditional Fourth Amendment analy-
sis.14 The court reiterates the inherent power of a sovereign to control
its borders and protect its "territorial integrity,"'1  and that searches con-
ducted at the border are generally reasonable simply because they occur
at the border." 6 The Ninth Circuit and the district court both agree that
the government's power here is at its zenith."17 The district court limits
this language, 1 8 but the Ninth Circuit takes it and runs with it.119 The
Ninth Circuit used United States v. Ross to make us believe that all prop-
erty can be searched at the border without any prior suspicion and that
all objects can be searched equally at the airport.' 20 This is off the mark.
The Supreme Court in Flores-Montano admitted some property searches
110. Id. at 1008.
111. Id. at 1010.
112. Id. at 1006-07.
113. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
114. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1006 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273
(1973)).
115. Id. (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004)).
116. Id. at 1006-07 (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); Torres v.
Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 473 (1979)).
117. Id. at 1007 ("[T]he '[g]overnment's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons
and effects is at its zenith at the international border.'") (quoting Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at
152); United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1002 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 533 F.3d 1003
(9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009) (citing the same quotation).
118. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (noting that "highly intrusive searches are not reasonable
merely because they take place at the border").
119. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1006-10.
120. Therefore, "[tihe luggage carried by a traveler entering the country may be
searched at random by a customs officer ... no matter how great the traveler's
desire to conceal the contents may be." Furthermore, "a traveler who carries a
toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf [may] claim
an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the
sophisticated executive with the locked attachd case."
Id. at 1007 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982)) (alterations in original)
(citation omitted).
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would need a measurable amount of prior suspicion to search.' The
Court recognized that the government does not have carte blanche
authority to search, even at the border.1 22 The Ninth Circuit overstates
the government's power to search at the border very early in its opinion
to make this case seem like a slam dunk.
B. Is the Search of a Laptop Intrusive?
Next, the court opines on the distinction between whether searches
should be deemed routine or nonroutine at the border.1 23 The court
wants to believe Montoya de Hernandez124 and Flores-Montano125 cre-
ate a need for reasonable suspicion only on highly intrusive searches of
the persons, not on any type of nondestructive property search. 2 6 While
the Supreme Court repeatedly announces that there are not routine and
nonroutine searches at the border, but only intrusive and nonintrusive
ones, 1 27 the search here is not considered "particularly offensive" by the
Ninth Circuit.1 28 The court here suggests the search is just like if the
government was to search the contents of a backpack or luggage.129 The
Ninth Circuit even goes so far as to suggest property searches are almost
121. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 n.2 ("We again leave open the question, whether, and
under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed unreasonable because of the
particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.") (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted); Id. at 155-56 ("While it may be
true that some searches of property are so destructive as to require a different result, this was not
one of them.").
122. See id. at 155-56, 155 n.2.
123. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008.
124. Montoya de Hernandez involved the inspection of a defendant's alimentary canal for
cocaine. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 532-33 (1985).
125. Complete disassembly and reassembly of a gas tank was not considered destructive and
did not need reasonable suspicion. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155-56. The Court did not
address whether drilling into of the body of the car would be considered sufficiently destructive.
Id. at 154, n.2.
126. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1007-08 ("Other than when 'intrusive searches of the person' are
at issue, the Supreme Court has held open the possibility, 'that some searches of property are so
destructive as to require' particularized suspicion.") (quoting Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at
155-56) (citation omitted).
127. The Court of Appeals seized on language from our opinion in United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, in which we used the word "routine" as a descriptive term
in discussing border searches. The Court of Appeals took the term "routine,"
fashioned a new balancing test, and extended it to searches of vehicles. But the
reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of
highly intrusive searches of the person-dignity and privacy interests of the person
being searched-simply do not carry over to vehicles. Complex balancing tests to
determine what is a "routine" search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more "intrusive"
search of a person, have no place in border searches of vehicles.
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (citations omitted).
128. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009.
129. Id. at 1009.
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never intrusive.13° By doing this the court is distinguishing and doing
away with all the cases that the lower court cites dealing with border
searches of the person.1 31 These cases state that some heightened mea-
sure of suspicion is needed before an intrusive search of a person can be
performed.132 The property search cases that the Ninth Circuit relies on
significantly bolster its case, 133 but those cases do not deal with the
search of the computer as in Arnold. The search of the computer in
Arnold is more analogous to the intrusive bodily searches than to the
property cases, especially the vehicle search cases. The Ninth Circuit is
sorely mistaken to distinguish this case from the more humiliating
searches that can take place at the airport.
C. Rejection of the Lower Court's Sliding Scale Test
The Ninth Circuit describes the lower court's reliance on United
States v. Vance'34 as "erroneous" and rejects the lower court's central
premise that a balancing test must be used to weigh the search's intru-
siveness against the government's interests.1 35 In Vance, the suspect was
patted down after a flight from Hawaii to Guam. 136 The Vance court did
not suppress the evidence turned up, but noted that "[a]s the search
becomes more intrusive, more suspicion is needed." '137 The Ninth Cir-
cuit's Arnold opinion reads Vance to apply only to searches of the
130. Arnold argues that the district court was correct to apply an intrusiveness analysis
to a laptop search despite the Supreme Court's holding in Flores-Montano, by
distinguishing between one's privacy interest in a vehicle compared to a laptop.
However, this attempt to distinguish Flores-Montano is off the mark. The Supreme
Court's analysis determining what protection to give a vehicle was not based on the
unique characteristics of vehicles with respect to other property, but was based on
the fact that a vehicle, as a piece of property, simply does not implicate the same
"dignity and privacy" concerns as "highly intrusive searches of the person."
Id. at 1008. (quoting Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152).
131. In any event, the district court's holding that particularized suspicion is required to
search a laptop, based on cases involving the search of the person, was erroneous.
Its reliance on such cases as United States v. Vance to support its use of a sliding
intrusiveness scale to determine when reasonable suspicion is needed to search
property at the border is misplaced.
Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1002-04 (C.D.
Cal. 2006), rev'd, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009)).
132. See Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (citing United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912-13
(9th Cir. 1980) (real suspicion required for strip search); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d
805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967) (heightened suspicion required for cavity search); United States v.
Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970) (articulable suspicion required for strip
search)).
133. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008-10 (discussing the search of the computer in the context of
property and vehicle search cases).
134. 62 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 1995).
135. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008.
136. Vance, 62 F.3d at 1155.
137. Id. at 1156.
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human body. 138 The lower court read it to apply to the search of
Arnold's computer, which it deemed to be sufficiently intrusive to war-
rant some prior suspicion. 39 To limit the Vance holding, the Ninth Cir-
cuit quotes Flores-Montano and states that "complex balancing tests to
determine what is a 'routine' search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more
'intrusive' search of a person, have no place in border searches of vehi-
cles." 140 The Ninth Circuit's use of this passage is misplaced. Flores-
Montano dealt with the search of an automobile's gas tank.141 Arnold
deals with a much different kind of property, a computer. The language
from Flores-Montano did not seem to apply to all kinds of property. 42 It
just applied to vehicle searches at the border and meant that the gas tank
search couldn't be considered highly intrusive.' 43 There is a lower
expectation of privacy in an automobile than in a computer and even less
in that automobile's gas tank.'" A computer has the potential to store
everything about its owner. It is so much more than a gas tank, and
typical routine property border search analysis does not give justice to
the magnitude of the intrusion in such a case. The Supreme Court in
Flores-Montano did not want a balancing test used in dealing with vehi-
cle searches.' 45 The holding of Flores-Montano does not apply as
broadly as the Ninth Circuit wished it did while relying on it. The
Supreme Court, in many of its border search cases, is careful to limit the
holding to the specific search conducted in the case before it.' 4 6 Many
new types of searches can appear at the border, and some amount of
suspicion might be needed if the search is of such a highly intrusive
nature. The Ninth Circuit is using cases like Flores-Montano and Mon-
toya de Hernandez to stand for very broad principles of what is reasona-
138. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008.
139. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 533 F.3d
1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
140. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152
(2004)).
141. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 150.
142. The Court in Flores-Montano was careful to limit its holding to removal of the
automobile's gas tank. It did not address other concerns about automobile disassembly and even
conceded that some property searches conducted at the border may need to be preceded by
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 155-56.
143. Id. at 152 ("[Tlhe reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in
the case of highly intrusive searches of the person ... simply do not carry over to vehicles.").
144. The defendant's lowered expectation of privacy in his car and its gas tank was a
significant factor in the outcome of the case. See id. at 154.
145. The Court states that no balancing test is needed to search a vehicle at the border, but
specifically differentiates this from some highly intrusive searches of the person that may need a
reasonable balancing test because they implicate dignity and privacy concerns. Id. at 152.
146. See, e.g., id. at 155 ("For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Government's authority
to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble,
and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank.").
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ble at the border, when they clearly do not stand for such principles.' 47
The Supreme Court even states that it leaves open many questions deal-
ing with vehicle searches in Flores-Montano.148 Montoya de Hernandez
leaves open many questions about bodily searches. 149 The Ninth Circuit
was misplaced to believe that these cases make Arnold a simple routine
border search case delineated on whether the search is of property or of
the body. The sliding scale approach used in Vance, and relied upon by
the lower court, seems to be more on point for the search of a com-
puter's files.150 The privacy concerns of the computer search would war-
rant such a careful determination of what the government's interests are
and what amount of power it can use to achieve these goals.
The search of a computer implicates the same dignity and privacy
concerns as a search of the person. While the search may not endanger
physical dignity like a cavity search or alimentary canal search,1 51 it
damages the individual's mental and psychological dignity. 152 The Dis-
trict Court correctly analogized the computer more similarly to the
human brain, than to a vehicle.' 53 The reasons are obvious. The govern-
ment can read an individual's most personal thoughts, see intimate pic-
tures, track Internet browsing history, and follow private
conversations. 54 The privacy concerns of the individual are clearly
implicated by this search of the computer, and it is not to be analogized
to a car or luggage.1 55 Once the sliding scale approach from below was
done away with, the Ninth Circuit had an easy time characterizing this
147. The Court limits each holding to the specific type of search performed. See id. (gas tank
searches); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985) (alimentary
canal search).
148. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155 n.2 ("We again leave open the question whether, and
under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed unreasonable because of the
particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Because the issues are not presented today we suggest no view on what level of
suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches such as strip, body-
cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches. Both parties would have us decide the issue of
whether aliens possess lesser Fourth Amendment rights at the border; that question
was not raised in either court below and we do not consider it today.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 n.4.
150. See United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 1995) ("As the search becomes
more intrusive, more suspicion is needed.").
151. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 534-35.
152. A large concern facing the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456 (1966), was
the use of psychologically deceptive techniques during interrogation. The Court said of the mental
tactics used by police-they "exact[ ] a heavy toll on individual libert[ies] .... To be sure, this is
not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity." Id. at 455-57.
153. See United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003-04 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 533
F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
154. See id. at 1003-04.
155. Id. at 1003 (citing United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004)).
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search as just-another typical border search case. 56
D. Mobile Homes, Papers Bags, and Computers
The court gets even further sidetracked from the relevant issue and
goes into a discussion on the noteworthy container cases. 157 California
v. Acevedo158 is used by the court for the proposition that storage capac-
ity of the computer is irrelevant to the intrusiveness of the search and
that the computer, like any other container, is subject to typical border
search analysis. 59 California v. Carney,16 ° regarding a mobile home
search, is another case relied on by the Ninth Circuit. 161 Carney is also
not helpful because since a mobile home is subject to the vehicle excep-
tion to the warrant requirement it does not bolster the court's argument
that a computer is a traditional container. 162 The Fourth Circuit recog-
nized this distinction in Ickes and stated, "However the Constitution lim-
its the government's ability to search a person's vehicle generally, our
law is clear that searches at the border are a different matter alto-
gether." 163 The container and the amount that it can store are really not
important. The key factor is the intrusiveness of the search, which has
been reiterated by the Supreme Court in border search cases."
If the computer was going to be searched like a container then it
could be x-rayed to make sure it did not contain something within its
casing. This would be the only way that these cases have anything to do
with the issue at hand in Arnold. A traditional container-like a bag,
luggage, or locker-contains a tangible object.165 And the worthiness of
the container is not relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. 6 6 Here, the
computer is not being searched like a traditional container so the cases
do not apply. The computer must be turned on, and the thing to be
156. United States v. Arnold,-533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1312 (2009).
157. Id. at 1009-10.
158. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
159. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1010. Acevedo is not really on point with Arnold. Acevedo holds
that if the police have probable cause to search a vehicle, then it is reasonable to search a container
located within the vehicle, even if the probable cause does not go to the container itself. Acevedo,
500 U.S. at 580
160. 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
161. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009-10. Carney holds that even though a mobile home is
"capable of functioning as a home," it still is a movable vehicle and subject to search only on a
finding of probable cause. Carney, 471 U.S. at 393-95.
162. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009-10 (discussing Carney, 471 U.S. 386).
163. United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 503 (4th Cir. 2005).
164. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 567 (1991) (paper bag containing
marijuana).
166. Carney, 471 U.S. at 394 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982)).
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searched is not a tangible object. Instead, it is an electronic file or some-
thing that must be manipulated for the human eye to see it. This search
is far different from opening up a bag and finding cocaine, which the
Ninth Circuit seems to think this is analogous to. 16 7 In the end, the Ninth
Circuit concludes that the search here was reasonable without any prior
suspicion and that the child pornography found on Arnold's computer
should be admitted.
1 68
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE AT THE AIRPORT INSTEAD
A. Border Search Exception Should be Eliminated
Any search founded on neither probable cause nor reasonable sus-
picion should not be constitutional. 169 Thus, the border search exception
needs to be eliminated from our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
government should not be allowed to violate the constitution strictly
because the situation arises at our nation's borders. The constitutional
guarantees should apply at all times to restrain the power of the govern-
ment and to provide the greatest freedom from arbitrary police power to
the individual.17 0 The Supreme Court's case law has given the govern-
ment wide latitude in ignoring the constitution at the border.1 7 ' The bal-
ancing test of reasonableness has now swung right, very much in favor
of the government.1 72 Courts have routinely decided that individuals
have no expectation of privacy at the border and that searches conducted
there are nearly always constitutional.1 73 But individuals do have an
expectation of privacy at the airport. The government may have a higher
interest in searching items at the border, but the individual's interests
sitting across from the government's on the scale are not any lower than
if the search had occurred within the interior of the country. In this case,
167. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009-10.
168. Id. at 1008, 1010.
169. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) ("The Fourth Amendment
requires that searches and seizures be reasonable. A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in
the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. While such suspicion is not an irreducible
component of reasonableness, we have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual
rule does not apply.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Government of the United States bears an obligation to obey the
Fourth Amendment; that obligation is not lifted simply because the law enforcement officers were
agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, nor because the evidence obtained by those
officers was to be used in civil deportation proceedings.").
171. See Chae Chang Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603
(1889).
172. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004); United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539-40, 544 (1985).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977); United States v. Flores-
Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 503 (4th Cir. 2005).
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since we are dealing with balancing, the balance should be struck in
terms of a reasonable suspicion requirement. The search at the border
can occur if the government has a well-founded reasonable suspicion.
This strikes the balance somewhere in between the best case for the
government and the individual.
Admittedly, the government does have legitimate concerns at the
border. Its interests are undoubtedly higher there, where the country is
the most vulnerable to outside influence and disruption. 174 The govern-
ment should be given a slight advantage there as compared to within the
country. Even conceding this point, the government should need to have
a prior reasonable suspicion because searches will be not as arbitrary if
some prior suspicion is required as opposed to no suspicion. 175 The gov-
ernment should not get complete authority there, as they have been
given under the existing border search exception. 176 Some suspicion
should be required before a search could take place. This would strike
the balance between state concerns and the dignity of the individual.
B. Laptop Searches are Highly Intrusive and Nonroutine
The search of a computer's files is highly intrusive. While differing
from a stomach pump or cavity search, the search of a computer can
have all the lasting stigma and privacy concerns as the latter.' 77 The
district court was correct to reason that the computer was just like the
mind. According to the court, "opening and viewing confidential com-
puter files implicates dignity and privacy interests. Indeed, some may
value the sanctity of private thoughts memorialized on a data storage
device above physical privacy."178
The lower court also stated that "[a] laptop and its storage devices
have the potential to contain vast amounts of information. People keep
all types of personal information on computers, including diaries, per-
174. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603-04.
175. The complete move to reasonableness balancing in Fourth Amendment analysis has never
completely occurred. The Court has never truly overruled Katz, but the exceptions seem to be the
rule. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
176. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977) (describing and affirming the
government's plenary power at the border); United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
177. United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 533 F.3d
1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009) ("Attorneys' computers may contain
confidential client information. Reporters' computers may contain information about confidential
sources or story leads. Inventors' and corporate executives' computers may contain trade
secrets.").
178. Id. at 1003. "[G]overnment intrusions into the mind-specifically those that would cause
fear or apprehension in a reasonable person-are no less deserving of Fourth Amendment scrutiny
than intrusions that are physical in nature." Id. (quoting United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279
F.3d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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sonal letters, medical information, photos and financial records."' 179 The
lower court was correct in its understanding of intrusiveness and how it
applied to this search. This search was not like a vehicle or a briefcase.
The computer plays a certain, specific role in the everyday lives of indi-
viduals. A search of the files can have a more acute impact on the trav-
eler than a different type of search of a more typical piece of property. A
wide-ranging fishing expedition into the contents of a computer's files
can cause the same feelings of fear and apprehension in an individual as
a more physical search. If a search can strike fear into the heart of the
individual then it is of a highly intrusive nature, regardless of whether
the search is of a piece of property.
180
C. Laptop Searches Must be Limited in Scope
In addition to be being a highly intrusive search, the search of
Arnold's computer was not limited in scope and therefore was unconsti-
tutional. To be limited in scope the search must be no more intrusive
than necessary.'' A limited search of a computer at the airport would be
to turn the computer on and see whether it is a normally functioning
machine. Once the official learned that the computer was functioning
properly the search must end to maintain its limited nature. It could be x-
rayed to make sure the computer is not a bomb or contains some kind of
illegal material inside its casing. This is the amount of searching that
would be reasonable and limited in its scope under the current border
search doctrine. The container cases relied upon in the Ninth Circuit's
opinion 8 ' only increase the wide ranging nature of this search. A typical
container can be easily searched and the contents within are easily dis-
cernible. To search the files and contents of the computer's hard drive
the official must give it commands for the computer to spill its inner
secrets. Buttons must be clicked and keys must be typed to dive further
and further into the computer, making the search less and less limited in
its scope. The government has no interest in the material contained
within the computer at the border. The government has an interest in
regulating and enforcing customs, 83 not peering further into a person's
inner thoughts and habits that are stored within his computer. It is for the
owner and the owner alone. Viewing anything that it pleases is not a
179. Id. at 1003-04.
180. Id. at 1003. (citing Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d at 716).
181. See United States v. Price, 472 F.2d 573, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1973).
182. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1312 (2009) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); California v. Carney, 471 U.S.
386 (1985); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
183. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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legitimate governmental interest, even when in the name of fighting ter-
rorism and providing safety to Americans.
D. The Law Must Adapt With Technology
The presence of new technology in society has prompted the
Supreme Court to fashion new Fourth Amendment doctrine before. This
should be the next area where Fourth Amendment thinking needs to be
altered. The first such example of this is Katz v. United States.'84 Katz
abolished the need for a physical trespass to constitute a search and
extended Fourth Amendment protection when the government used an
electronic device to listen to and record a person in a phone booth.
185
Prior to Katz, the government's use of this device would not have vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment. 1
86
A more recent and important case demonstrating the need to alter
Fourth Amendment doctrine when it comes to new technology is Kyllo
v. United States.187 In Kyllo, the police searched a man's home without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, but this search was of a most
unusual sort. 188 From across the street, the police used a thermal image
scanner to detect heat that was being emitted through the walls by
Kyllo's marijuana-growing lamps.' 89 The Court held that the use of the
thermal scanner was a search, and therefore "presumptively unreasona-
ble without a warrant."'19 This type of rule should be applied to the
search of a laptop computer's files. The Court in Kyllo was concerned
that the device could pick up "intimate details," which is the exact same
concern in Arnold.'91 A search conducted without any prior suspicion
should not be able to detect all the intimate details of a person's life.
1 92
The intrusiveness and gravity of the liberty interest are too great to be
ignored in this area.'93 The Court in Kyllo continued by declining to
apply an "intimate details" standard because "no police officer would be
able to know in advance whether his... surveillance picks up 'intimate'
details-and thus would be unable to know in advance whether it is
184. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
185. Id. at 353.
186. Id. at 352-53 (discussing the change in technology and the Fourth Amendment
interpretation from the time of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
187. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
188. See id. at 29-30.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 34-35, 40.
191. Id. at 37-38; see United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003-04 (C.D. Cal. 2006),
rev'd, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
192. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37-38.
193. Id. at 34 (describing a particular concern over a person's privacy interests within their
home).
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constitutional."' 94 An unlimited power to search laptops will pose the
exact same concerns as the search in Kyllo. The border patrol officer has
no idea what he is going to find because he currently needs no justifica-
tion to conduct his search. It could turn up anything or nothing. This
unfettered ability to pry into the intimate details of an individual's life
should be "presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."' 95 While
modem technology is evolving at a more rapid pace than the common
law and Supreme Court jurisprudence, Kyllo is a shining example of the
Court recognizing that rules must keep up with society. The analysis of
laptop searches at the border must be given a similar reevaluation.
E. Laptop Searches are Outside the Scope of
Border Search Exception
Another reason that the border search exception should not be
applied to a laptop computer's files is the reasoning behind the border
search exception itself. In Montoya de Hernandez, the Court announced
again that this was a necessary rule to give the state sufficient power to
control contraband, collect tariffs and duties, and to prevent undocu-
mented immigration into the country. 19 6 None of these concerns apply
when a computer arrives at the border. The contraband contained on a
computer, usually child pornography, can be downloaded into this coun-
try without ever passing through the border. This is totally inapposite to
other types of contraband that must always be transported over a physi-
cal border. There is no way to smuggle drugs, aliens, or other forms of
contraband into the United States without them physically crossing the
border, allowing a border official to search and find these items. This
rationale underlying the government's ability to search at the border is
of no use when a computer is being searched. 97 If Arnold did not have
any "contraband" on his computer at the time of his search at the border,
he could easily have gone home and "smuggled" child pornography into
this country by using the same computer, and a border search of the
computer would have been powerless to prevent it. Without physical
contraband on the computer, the border search exception should not
apply to the computer because it is just another unnecessary aggrandize-
ment of police power into the private lives of individuals.
In addition, Arnold is not even being searched at the border. He is
194. Id. at 39.
195. Id. at 40.
196. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citing United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977)); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion
Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
197. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537.
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only at the functional equivalent of the border. '98 Again, the border
search exception was designed to prevent the entrance of physical con-
traband into the United States by crossing the physical border.' 99
Searching electronic files at the functional equivalent of the border
shows just how far out of hand this exception to the Fourth Amendment
has become. It has become a monster that the courts have decided to
keep enlarging in the name of increased security, when this country is
really no safer for it.
F. What Arnold Means to Everyone at the Airport
1. CURRENT SEPTEMBER 11TH THINKING
The need to combat terrorism is only briefly mentioned by the
Ninth Circuit in Arnold,2° but the war on terror rationale behind the
decision oozes and bubbles out of the opinion. The court in Arnold said
that it did not want to "protect terrorist communications. '2° 1 After Sep-
tember 11 th, this court suggests that citizens must lose more of their
privacy in the name of battling an amorphous enemy.
In a post-September 11 th world, the demand for tighter border
security and airline safety has become a key concern for many Ameri-
cans, 20 2 even at the expense of constitutional protections. 20 3 Tighter
security measures, increased storage of information technology, and
greater disregard for constitutional protections all led to the ultimate
holding in Arnold. "Since September 1 lth, government agents have been
searching and seizing laptops, digital cameras, cell phones, PDAs, and
other electronic media at border crossings" under the guise of legitimate
crime fighting,20 4 when this is just another example of expanded state
power at the cost of constitutional guarantees. Arnold's holding is a
198. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1312 (2009).
199. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
200. See Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1010.
201. Id. (citing and following the reasoning of United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir.
2005)).
202. Security, safety, and terrorism have become some of the most important issues in
Presidential elections since 2001. See, e.g., CNN Election Center 2008: Homeland Security, http://
www.cnn.comIELECTION/200/issues/issues.homelandsecurity.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
203. See generally Michelle Lirtzman, Surveillance Cameras Win Broad Support, ABC NEWS,
July 29, 2007, http://www.abcnews.go.comIUS/storyid=3422372&page=l (noting that the
majority of Americans favor the surveillance cameras for the extra security, despite the loss of
privacy).
204. See Bruce E. H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, Recent Developments in Commercial Speech
and Consumer Privacy Interests, in 952 PRAc'nsING LAW INsTrrUTE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 14142,
COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE DIGITAL ACE 53, 79 (2008).
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powerful tool for the government. As noted by one law firm client alert,
the effects of Arnold came quickly:
[R]ecent anecdotal [evidence] indicate[s] that many travelers are
being asked to boot up their laptop computers so that border officials
may search through the files stored on the computer's hard drive....
Some travelers have reported that their mobile phones, BlackBerrys
and other handheld devices have also been searched. In some cases,
they are merely looked at briefly while the traveler stands by; in other
cases, officers retain the devices for several hours and download the
content.205
While the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment is usu-
ally justified by the government's need to control and enforce customs at
the border," 6 the government notices that its new power is helpful in
general law enforcement. The government now claims it searches com-
puters at the airport to fight child pornography.2"" Interestingly, search-
ing computers is turning up child pornography rather than providing any
kind of additional safety to Americans. While child pornography is a
disgusting and heinous practice, "it is a fair summary of history to say
that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controver-
sies involving not very nice people."' 8
2. ARNOLD HAS ALREADY DOOMED ANOTHER TRAVELER
The holding of Arnold has already been followed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Singh.20 9 In Singh, the defendant was stopped at
the border based on possible immigration document fraud.210 The gov-
ernment decided to search his laptop computer. 21 ' The Singh opinion is
only three paragraphs long.212 Only one is dedicated to the Fourth
Amendment issue and the only case cited is Arnold.21 3 In the Ninth Cir-
cuit the holding in Arnold is devastating to an individual's claim of pri-
205. U.S. Client Alert: U.S. Border Officials May Search Travelers' Electronic Devices,
FRAGOMEN NEWS AND RESOURCES, July 31, 2008, http://www.fragomen.com/newsresources/xpr
NewsDetailFrag.aspx?xpST=USAlerts&news=205.
206. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977).
207. See FRAGOMEN NEWS AND RESOURCES, supra note 205. ("The U.S. Department of
Homeland Security ... claims that searches and seizures of electronic devices at the border are
justified by security concerns and in order to fight child pornography ....").
208. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 548 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. No. 07-30421, 2008 WL 4426643, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2008) (citing United States v.
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vacy in his computer at the border, and it could be equally crippling
around the country if Arnold is followed by the other Circuits. 214 So
much so that the Ninth Circuit deems it is the only case it would need to
cite to dispatch with Singh's argument in short shrift. It gives very little
credence to the notion that any reasonable suspicion would actually be a
requisite to perform a search of this type on Singh's computer.2 15 The
effect of the Arnold holding on searches such as these is described as
this:
The parties are familiar with the facts. We address the law. Singh's
argument that the border officer needed reasonable suspicion to
search his laptop computer is squarely foreclosed by United States v.
Arnold. There, we held that searches of the defendant's computer
hard drive at the border, like searches of other property, did not
require reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.21 6
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment is just a shadow of its former self, from the
height of its breadth in Katz, 2 17 to where the Amendment is being com-
pletely ignored in Arnold.218 The Amendment is on a slow march
towards its demise, where nearly all governmental search and seizure is
deemed to be reasonable. An overarching rules structure based on proba-
ble cause and warrants has nearly completely been replaced by a balanc-
ing test that is skewed in favor of the government in almost every case.
The Court has come to embrace reasonableness in the context of
searches conducted at the border in case after case, upholding arbitrary
searches based on no justification. The government agents have nearly
unlimited discretion to conduct these searches. This border search
exception is a doctrine that must be done away with as repugnant to the
spirit of the Fourth Amendment. The government should not be given a
completely arbitrary power to search individuals, even when the search
takes place at the functional equivalent of the international border. The
constitution should not be placed aside in favor of an absolute power for
law enforcement and border patrol just because a search takes place at
the border.
If this shameful practice is going to continue, then what happened
to Arnold should not fit within this exception. The search of a laptop is
highly offensive and intrusive. A reasonable suspicion must be neces-
sary before the search can take place. Here, the agents had no reason to
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (internal citations omitted).
217. See supra Part I.A.
218. See supra Part IV.A-D.
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believe Arnold was doing anything out of the ordinary, but arbitrarily
searched him because they possessed this power. Even though he hap-
pened to have incriminating photos does not mean the next poor individ-
ual will; who knows how many people have already been subjected to
this arbitrary practice? A search is not constitutional because of "what it
turns up."
2 19
The intrusiveness of the laptop search is obvious. It intrudes into its
owner's thoughts and feelings, just as if it were his or her mind. Being
able to search documents, Internet browsing history, and anything else
an individual has in his or her laptop can be just as degrading as a physi-
cal search. The search here was also not limited in scope. This fact alone
should make the search fail any type of constitutional scrutiny. A limited
search of a computer would verify whether the device is operational and
not a concealed bomb or a carrier of some type of contraband. A wide-
ranging foray into his privacy is not reasonable because it is in no way
limited.
The border search exception is supposed to help the government
enforce customs and create greater security at the border.220 Since Sep-
tember 11 th, many Americans welcome their new loss of privacy for a
sense of extra protection. The government has not been very effective in
using this power to provide extra security, but, since it is finding trav-
elers carrying pornography, the government conveniently now says that
that was a rationale behind the power all along. 221 The decision here has
wide-ranging impacts on international travel. Business travelers must be
prepared to have documents, files, and anything else they store on their
computer searched when entering the country. Any citizen must be pre-
pared to divulge whatever information his or her computer possesses
because the government wants to see it. The government is very inter-
ested in what you are thinking, seeing, watching, and reading. This
broadening of the border search exception will now give the government
a nice excuse to look.
219. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 n.10 (1968).
220. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977).
221. See FRAGOMEN NEWS AND RESOURCES, supra note 205.
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